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 BEYOND DISINTERESTEDNESS 
 
In the spirit of a critical reconsideration of the foundations of aesthetics, I should like to 
place in question the most fundamental premise of traditional theory, the notion of aesthetic 
disinterestedness.
1
  I find in certain recent modes of reflection an openness and a provisionality 
that are a welcome alternative to the restrictiveness of that tradition.  While one term for this 
alternative course is 'postmodern,' I do not want to burden it with all the critical baggage that has 
accumulated around that troublesome concept, nor do I accept those exaggerated 
pronouncements made in its name that have led Stefan Morawski and others to regard 
postmodernism as a hopeless and destructive impasse.
2
  These make it easy to discredit so boldly 
iconoclastic an intellectual development as it.  I, for one, welcome the flexibility and pluralism 
that are the most salutary features of some of the recent discussions of intepretation and criticism, 
without allying myself with the particular brand of nihilism that often accompanies them.   
At the same time, this discussion does not develop an alternative position; that is a larger 
undertaking than is possible here.  My purpose here is more modest yet essential in the 
reconstruction of aesthetics:  It is to see what remains of value in the traditional approach once its 
misleading assumptions and claims have been set aside.  Genuine insights are to be found here 
that may be obscured, on the one hand, by programs for the emancipation of aesthetics and, on 
the other, by the heavy weight of history that endeavors to subsume the diversity of the new  
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 2 
under the order of the familiar.  Is it possible to distill those insights out of traditional theory in a 
form that renders them still useful in new contexts? 
The eighteenth century bequeathed a theoretical frame to modern aesthetics that has 
profoundly influenced the understanding and appreciation of art for over two hundred years.
3
  Its 
key concepts, supplemented with a few additions from the romantic era, continue to supply the 
vocabulary for accounts of the arts of both scholar and layperson.  Nothing seems more natural 
than to think of aesthetic appreciation as a distinctive kind of attention, contemplative and 
disinterested, that is directed toward a work of art apart from any other consideration, particularly 
of use, that would compromise our satisfaction in its intrinsic value.  It was Kant who gave this 
theory its definitive formulation:  "Taste in the beautiful is alone a disinterested and free 
satisfaction; for no interest, either of sense or of reason, here forces our assent....Taste is the 
faculty of judging of an object or a method of representing it by an entirely disinterested 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction.  The object of such satisfaction is called beautiful."
4
   
In some respects this is an unexceptional theory of beauty, expressing our customary 
sense of aesthetic beauty and resting harmoniously alongside our common beliefs about science 
and morality.  These three regions--science, morality, and art, in fact, constitute the principal 
domains of Kantian philosophy, which incorporates aesthetics into a division of the realm that 
has served the cognitive purposes of philosophy well.  And at the center of aesthetics lies the 
notion of disinterestedness, where it has resided since that discipline acquired its modern identity 
in the eighteenth century.   
Yet when we measure this traditional view against the demand on any theory that it give a 
satisfactory account of the data, we find it lacking.  Not only is the attitude it enjoins difficult to 
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 3 
apply to many experiences of art, so that the nineteenth century chafed under its strictures and the 
twentieth has endeavored to elude them altogether; aesthetic disinterestedness has been a mixed 
blessing even for those traditional arts for which the theory was originally designed.  Theoretical 
developments since the Enlightenment have, in fact, pressed the theory of disinterestedness quite 
out of shape.  The Romantic attraction to the emotional and expressive dimensions of aesthetic 
experience, and the sharing of such experience through artistic communication, have definitively 
incorporated the personal contribution into the artistic and receptive processes.  And in the 
present century, overt appreciative participation in the artistic process has increased to become a 
major feature.  Moreover, late twentieth century intellectual movements like hermeneutics and 
deconstruction have undermined the cognitive structure in which disinterestedness has its place, 
dismissing the very idea of objective, universal judgment as mythical and impossible.   
In the light of these developments, it is tempting to discard the idea of disinterestedness 
as both false and anachronistic, perhaps historically important but now a distinct impediment to 
aesthetic understanding.  Rejecting disinterestedness outright is not unreasonable, given the 
tenacity with which that theory retains its hold on scholarship.  Artists have long since thrown it 
over, aesthetic appreciation often finds it irrelevant, and theorists have increasingly attacked it.
5
   
But it is too easy to dismiss our forebears as deluded, a solution as simplistic as it is 
common in both art and politics.  I should like rather to pursue the issue here more 
circumspectly.  For traditional theory was trying to do something important:  to identify what is 
distinctive about art and distinguishes it from other things.  An uncritical, wholesale dismissal of 
traditional aesthetics may be unnecessarily violent, and in the enthusiasm of liberation we stand 
in danger of discarding what is meaningful about the aesthetic, entirely.  The question that is 
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really before us is, then, what marks aesthetic appreciation and how can we identify it?  If 
disinterestedness can no longer be taken as its distinguishing feature, what can? 
Disinterestedness lies at the heart of a cluster of ideas that developed in the writings of 
English and French theorists during the last half of the eighteenth century whose purpose was to 
identify first moral and then aesthetic experience.  What was common to both, these writers 
determined, was the absence of interest, that is, of egoistic concern.  Shaftesbury, who, along 
with Hutcheson and Alison, was one of the principal contributors to this view, contrasted "the 
disinterested love of God," a love pursued for its own sake, with the more common motive of 
serving God "for interest merely."  The disinterested love of God is, then, wholly intrinsic.
6
  
Similarly, as the notion of the aesthetic evolved among the British writers of this period, 
culminating in Addison, disinterestedness gradually emerged as its animating idea.
7
  This 
development became explicit in Kant, who installed this idea as the key term in aesthetic theory.
8
 
Initially, it seems odd to forego any concern with practice, ends, and consequences in 
ethics, and most discussions, pace Kant, retain an awkward and uneasy balance between the 
inherent importance of intention and the consequences of action.  Yet for art an exclusive 
concern with intrinsic value would appear eminently appropriate, since there are few other areas 
of human experience where we consider an object entirely for its own sake and appreciate it 
wholly for its inherent qualities.  This was, in fact, Shaftesbury's move, for whom, moreover, it is 
only in the object apprehended--God or a work of art--that we can distinguish the virtuous person 
from the art lover.  Indeed, one might characterize Shaftesbury's account of moral experience as 
preeminently aesthetic.   
My purpose here, however, is not to reexamine this history.  That has been done 
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  It is rather to explore the idea of disinterestedness in order to discover whether it 
holds any insights worth retaining at a time in the evolution of aesthetic theory when its 
traditional meaning seems both inappropriate and misleading.
10
  Disinterestedness, moreover, 
does not come unaccompanied:  It has its coterie.  Ideas about universality, the art object, 
contemplation, distance, isolation, and value cluster about disinterestedness and are hard to keep 
separate.  In reassessing this notion, then, we must consider its relation to these correlative 
concepts.  This is no mere exercise in conceptual analysis, however.  It is an attempt to get at the 
substantive claims of disinterestedness in order to determine whether there is anything in the idea 
worth retaining that can provide a stable center for aesthetics at a time in intellectual history in 
which the modernism of the recent past has been displaced by pluralism and indeterminacy.  My 
answer is that there is, but it is a residue so attenuated that its value is better realized when the 
idea is recast and reinvigorated in a form that leaves the concept of disinterestedness and its 
tradition behind.  What, then, do disinterestedness and its related terms intend and offer under 
present conditions? 
Contemplative is the most common descriptive of the appreciative stance toward art.  In 
1725 there was nothing unusual in Hutcheson's readily associating beauty with the pleasures of 
contemplation.
11
  Over half a century later, when Kant wrote about the judgment of taste as 
contemplative and not, like pleasure, involving the impulse or stimulation of desire or, like good, 
involving the existence of the object, he sought to dissociate the beautiful from everything 
material and offer it as an entirely free satisfaction.   
Although Kant did not consider the judgment of taste a cognitive judgment, since it is not 
based on or directed toward concepts, contemplation, nonetheless, originates in classical thought 
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 6 
in cognitive and moral contexts.
12
  Pythagoras, for one, found in contemplation the completion of 
rational human nature, while Plato considered pure contemplation the ideal of human 
understanding.  Aristotle designated active reason as contemplation (theoria) and found in pure 
contemplation philosophical knowledge, intellectual enjoyment, and the completion of moral 
development.  And in the contemplation of the beautiful, Plotinus, like Plato, finds help in 
moving from the sensuously to the spiritually beautiful.
13
  So began a long tradition of finding 
the fulfillment of human development in the disengaged, contemplative intellect.   
This contemplative, intellectualist tradition in experience easily suggests itself as a 
commendation of whatever we wish to elevate, and was readily appropriated as the model for 
aesthetic appreciation.  Wordsworth's famous "emotion recollected in tranquility" has usually 
been taken to express the contemplative ideal applied to poetry, while Hegel conjectures that "the 
way men are occupied with the objects of art's creation remains throughout of a contemplative 
character."
14
  These typical instances of using contemplation to characterize aesthetic 
appreciation are expressed in Stolnitz's well-known definition of the aesthetic attitude as 
"disinterested and sympathetic attention to and contemplation of any object of awareness 
whatever, for its own sake alone."
15
 
Yet if we start from our appreciative experience of art and not from the philosophical 
tradition, contemplation is rather less convincing a characterization than we may have thought.  
Art, as that same classical tradition understood well, typically involves practical activity in its 
making, and it often does so in its appreciation, also.  Some instances are obvious, like moving 
around a sculpture, adopting various positions and distances in viewing a painting, approaching 
and entering a building.  There is, indeed, a kind of activation that all art requires, from following 
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the contrapuntal maneuvers in a fugue and organizing the narrative in a novel, to imaginatively 
realizing the images in a poem and participating subliminally in the movements of dance. The 
recent arts, however, have often made this explicit, not just in the form of walk-in sculptures and 
environments but in the growing use of interactive devices which enable the appreciator or 
audience to contribute to the work's development and, in interactive theater, video, painting, and 
sculpture, actually to assist in constructing the work.   
The removal and separateness, the passive attention we associate with contemplation 
have little place here.  One can be quietly, reflectively attentive toward an art object, to be sure, 
but that attentiveness does not does not display the impersonality or objectivity usually associated 
with the cognitive model of philosophical reflection.  That cognitive model, in fact, has little to 
do with aesthetic experience.
16
  Traditional theory, for which it is a suppressed premise, is not the 
result of the practice and appreciation of art but the consequence of an intellectualist tradition 
that reserves philosophy's position as foundational.  It assumes that you can talk about art without 
having to go to what artists or appreciators actually do. 
There are, of course, advantages to a theory that conforms so obediently to tradition.  
Until recently western philosophy has regularly worshipped at the temple of Apollo and viewed 
with distaste the practical, the technical, not to mention the Dionysian.  Aesthetics from the top 
down fits nicely with established doctrines, social as well as philosophical.  Recent attacks on the 
arts and on governmental support of the arts conveniently use a contemplative tradition of art and 
appreciation to revile, on moral grounds, work that breaks the barrier of polite discretion to do 
what good art has always done:  penetrate and awaken our awareness, and in ways that may not 
be comforting.  Aesthetics thus plays into the hands of the politics of expedience.  It makes art 
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safe by removing it from any disruptive social role, and protects the status quo against art that 
encourages social change by changing our perceptions.   
Is there, however, anything worth retaining in the notion of contemplation?  If we excise 
all that is extraneous to aesthetic practice, what is left is a call to directed attention and to open 
receptivity.  These are important, certainly, but they are obscured by the stronger connotations of 
contemplation.  Aesthetic appreciation does indeed require directed attention to whatever is 
present in the situation.  That need not be an art object in the usual sense but may be the 
perception of environmental sense qualities or associated images and memories.  Contemplation, 
too, urges us to an open-minded acceptance in appreciation, a willingness to accept without 
prejudice sounds, colors, materials, images, and forms that may be strangely dissonant with our 
customary experience of the arts.  Directed attention and open receptivity are important 
conditions of aesthetic appreciation, but we can better attain them without the distractions of 
contemplation.                                    
Another idea regularly associated with disinterestedness is the notion of distance.  
Traditionally distance has been used in identifying the removal of practical interest that has 
characterized aesthetic appreciation since the eighteenth century.  Not physical distance 
primarily, it is rather psychical distance, to use Bullough's famous term, that is used to denote 
that sense of detachment from practical affairs, from causes and consequences, considered 
necessary to identify and justify autonomous art objects.  The concern here seems to be with 
avoiding the disruptive intrusion of practical concerns.  For Edmund Burke, these, like terror 
when in danger or violent pain, render aesthetic delight impossible.
17
  Bullough argued that 
distance must be not only of a sufficient degree to avoid involving the appreciating subject's 
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ethical convictions, institutions, and organic affections, but at the other extreme, not so great as 
to make the art object seem artificial, improbable, empty, or absurd.
18
   
The arts have traditionally employed devices that seem designed to assist the spectator in 
lifting the occasion out of any practical context and placing it in a special, autonomous space of 
its own.  The pedestal and the stage raise sculpture and theater above the plane of ordinary life, 
the frame and the proscenium arch separate art and performances from their surroundings, special 
halls for the visual arts and for music provide what the cathedral does for religious worship, a 
sanctified space removed from the concerns of daily life.   
In aesthetics, the isolation of the art object is the correlative of appreciative distance.  
Science, like knowledge and practice in general, deals with the relations of things; art, on the 
contrary, must take them in isolation.  Thus, in a characteristic statement, Münsterberg maintains 
that "to isolate the object for the mind, means to make it beautiful, for it fills the mind without an 
idea of anything else;...and this complete repose, where the objective impression becomes for us 
an ultimate end in itself, is the only possible content of the true experience of beauty."
19
   
But is this sense of detachment necessary for aesthetic appreciation?  Burke, Bullough, 
and others cite situations in which one's personal safety is so much in jeopardy that self-
preservation usurps total attention.  Clearly, the possibility of aesthetic experience is minimized 
when the layers and aura of awareness are preempted by an overriding urgency.  Yet intrinsic 
awareness does not require excluding practical interests but rather retaining qualitative 
apprehension.  Burke's discussion, in fact, occurs in connection with the sublime, where, indeed, 
part of the awesomeness of the situation inheres precisely in its threat.  There is an aesthetic 
appeal in walking in a thunderstorm, standing by the shore on which storm-driven waves are 
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crashing, and gazing at a meteor shower in the night sky.   
Nor need the aesthetic exclude purpose.  Can the surgeon be aesthetically involved when 
performing surgery?  When the goal dominates attention and is external to the situation at hand, 
the aesthetic factor clearly disappears.  But in most practical situations this need not be the case, 
for our present perception affects these occasions qualitatively, giving them tone and uniqueness. 
 The artist's purpose can stand as a model here, for that purpose is embodied in the art object.  
The goal of the creative artist is to create experience, a goal not extraneous but embedded in the 
very experience, itself.  There is no need for a separation from other objects, other activities, 
other situations.  The choice is not between extrinsic and inherent considerations.  Often the 
aesthetic lies in their fusion. 
Even more clearly than with contemplation, the recent arts seem deliberately to renounce 
distance.  Theater is one of the more striking cases of such abandonment.  Devices for involving 
the audience have proliferated on the modern stage.  Theater has stepped down from the 
traditional raised stage to carry out its action in and sometimes with the collaboration of the 
audience.  At times the audience has a hand in constructing the drama by selecting from among 
alternative endings.  Grotowski's paratheatrics, for example, attempts to dissolve the separation 
between the actor and the spectator by transforming theater into an actual event.  Even Brecht 
could not abandon the compelling character of the dramatic situation by invoking his "alienation 
effect."  It does not, as he intended, enable us to grasp the historical cause of a situation but 
reinvigorates theatrical participation and enlarges the meaning levels of which we are aware.  
Other arts have been as ready as theater to forsake the traditional conventions of distance.  It is as 
difficult to maintain aesthetic distance when entering a building as when walking through a 
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Calder stabile or climbing upon one of di Suvero's ride 'em sculptures.  Environmental music 
surrounds the audience with musicians or speakers, undermining even the illusion of distance and 
emphasizing the contextual quality of musical experience. 
Does anything of value remain in the notion of distance?  Little, I think, beyond an 
injunction to attend to the intrinsic qualities of objects and occasions.  This kind of perceptual 
attention is exceedingly important in aesthetic appreciation.  It does not, however, require 
separating and isolating the art object or excluding our purposes and goals, as long as they are 
embedded in present perception. 
Central among the intellectualizing influences on traditional theory is the need to attain 
universality.  Part of the eighteenth century's geometrical model of science, universality was 
difficult to secure in circumstances like the aesthetic, where the observer's contribution is so 
much a constitutive factor.  For Kant, the disinterestedness of aesthetic judgment implies that its 
satisfaction extend to everyone.  We cannot secure this universality concerning the beautiful with 
concepts, he held, since beauty is not a characteristic of the object but concerns the object only as 
it is represented to the subject.  Hence the only universality that is possible is subjective.  Yet for 
Kant the judgment of taste is able to achieve a subjective universality, valid for everyone, by 




Since Kant, universality, which seemed equally necessary and attainable in science, 
morality, and aesthetics, has slipped out of their grasp.  Aesthetic subjectivity, ethical relativism, 
and now scientific probability and indeterminacy have made universal judgments difficult and 
problematic.  But in an intellectual shift of major dimensions, universality has no longer come to 
Arnold Berleant, The British Journal of Aesthetics, 34/3 (July 1994).   Published in a Chinese translation.   
Summarized in Japanese in  Bigaku, No. 178 (Vol. 45/2), 1994, p.70.  Published in a Russian translation in 
Polygnosis, No. 2 (1999), 49-59. 
 
 12 
be considered possible.  Indeed, it no longer seems necessary.  We now recognize universality to 
have been misappropriated from science for aesthetics and a mistaken goal all along, and we can 
forego this requirement with an easy conscience.
21
   
In aesthetics, the cognitive claims of judgment are no longer central but derive instead 
from experience.  We must begin with the appreciation of art and nature, where interpretive and 
critical judgments originate.  Not only need our account of experience not be guided by cognitive 
demands; aesthetic judgment must itself be led by experience and practice.  This priority of 
experience has led to a greater openness to different ethnic traditions, to innovative artistic forms, 
and to alternative types of artistic activity unprejudiced by invidious distinctions of high and low 
art, decorative and fine art, or popular and serious art.  The generality of any artistic form or 
aesthetic judgment has now become the consequence of its context and can be valid and 
imperative to that degree without the imprimatur of universality.       
Universality, distance, and contemplation surround disinterestedness.  While they supply 
important elements for an aesthetic of experience, that contribution is misappropriated by 
philosophic, cognitive traditions that are foreign to the aesthetic domain.  Can we find in the 
notion of disinterestedness a similar residue of insight that can be recast into a different mold?  
Setting aside its efforts at exclusivity, at barring interest, purpose, and egoistic concern, at 
focusing on only intrinsic qualities and value, is there anything of importance that remains for 
aesthetic appreciation? 
Disinterestedness claims both too much and too little.  It focuses on intrinsic value, on the 
immediate, and on the perceptual.  Important though these be, they need to be enlarged to 
accommodate the range of conditions in which aesthetic appreciation occurs.  We have already 
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seen how intrinsic value often coexists with instrumental uses.  A building is no less gratifying 
aesthetically when it functions well; this, indeed, can enhance its aesthetic force.  The drama in 
the design of a courtroom, the public performance embodied in a council chamber are bound up 
with their architectural achievement no less than the song with the singer, the voice with the poet, 
the movement with the dancer.  There are, I maintain, elements of function and consequence in 
every artistic occasion, and these bind it to the surrounding life of a culture.  While appreciative 
experience imposes an immediacy of focus, a directness of presentation that dominates the 
situation, we live surrounded by auras of meaning, association, and memory that are the backdrop 
of every occasion.  The mediate joins the immediate, the implied the directly presented, in art as 
everywhere else.  What distinguishes aesthetic perception is rather the greater intensity of focus 
on what is immediately present. 
Part of what is problematic about disinterestedness is its dualistic structuring of the 
aesthetic situation.  On the one hand it designates a state of mind, a psychological set that 
subjectifies aesthetic reception.  In addition to psychologizing appreciation, disinterestedness 
regards the object of aesthetic perception as separate and independent.  Yet both perceiver and 
object are important but incomplete.  Neither is a discrete element in the aesthetic field but both 
combine in mutually creative and dependent ways:  No aesthetic perceiver without a perceptual 
object; no perceptual object without a perceiver who activates it in experience.  And that 
experience is more than a subjective, mental one.  It draws not just on the entire range of sensory 
receptors but on the involvement of the body in a unified, total experience.
22
 
There are still other unfortunate doctrines implicated in the dualism of disinterestedness.  
The narrowness of focus in appreciation suggests a search for aesthetic qualities in the object, 
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which brings with it a set of unresolved difficulties in identifying and locating such qualities.  
Moreover, the essentialism that an inquiry into aesthetic qualities implies is another sign of the 
ontological isolation of the aesthetic we need to overcome.  Disinterestedness, finally, was for 
Kant the condition for attaining subjective universality, a goal we now understand to be 
unrealizable and false.  After dismissing distance, universality, and disinterestedness, Nietzsche's 
condemnation of the aesthetic irrelevance of philosophy is definitive, for  "We have got from 
these philosophers of beauty definitions which...are marred by a complete lack of esthetic 
sensibility."
23
    
In the face of these difficulties, is there anything of value that remains in the idea of 
disinterestedness?  Is there anything worth retaining in the efforts of this theory to identify the 
aesthetic?  Let me approach the question indirectly by asking it first of the related notions. 
Contemplation, once its cognitive context is dropped, conveys the importance in 
appreciation of directed awareness and open receptivity.  If a reflective quality is present, it 
appears as meaning not cognized but experienced directly, and as the resonance of association 
and memory.
24
  From distance we emphasize the qualities of objects and situations, emphasizing 
intrinsic perception but often alongside purposes and goals.  For this, moreover, we do not 
require the separate identity of the art object, since the object need not be separate and 
independent of the beholder, and there may not even be a discriminable object.
25
  Instead of the 
concern of cognitive judgment for universality, we can begin to identify forms and conditions of 
shared experience.  Art is, I am convinced, fundamentally social, even when engaged in most 
privately.  Appreciation, at its heart, joins us in a collaborative act with the artist, in a shared 
intimacy of experience.  Some arts, like dance and theater, create a social situation involving a 
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collective audience.  Choral music may become the occasion for an extraordinary experience of 
community.  And even on the level of critical or normative judgment, we can easily relinquish 
universality in favor of common meanings and evaluations within various communities.
26
 
What, finally, is left of disinterestedness?  Not a psychological attitude or the exclusion of 
utility or purpose, but immediate and intense focus, direct presentation, and a valuing of those 
qualities inherent in the aesthetic field.  Instead of a unique or special attitude, what remains is 
perception, but perception that is quantitatively more intense and qualitatively more varied and 
complex than in ordinary experience. 
At base, disinterestedness, like its related notions of contemplation, distance, and 
universality, rests on a division of experience.  It separates the aesthetic perceiver from the object 
of appreciation, and then seeks ways to rejoin them in tenuous relationships that abandon the 
remarkable primacy of the aesthetic by translating it into the foreign modalities of cognition and 
philosophy.  What is left of these notions once the extraneous has been excised is best realized in 
a context that embodies the continuities in appreciative experience.  In place of disinterestedness 
theory, then, we must recast ideas of aesthetic appreciation into a positive, less prejudicial 
account.  It is a setting that can realize in shared experience important qualities often neglected:  
perceptual receptivity, directness of presentation and immediacy of awareness, concentration on 
intrinsic qualities of perception and meaning, collaboration with artist and performer that is so 
much a part of the appreciative act, and the resonance of association and memory through which 
the aesthetic occasion expands outward to other regions of life.  
This collapse of objectivity, this failure of universality, are apostasies only for the false 
god of modernism.  In its place we have an aesthetics of appreciation that recognizes the 
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legitimate pluralism in the diverse contexts and responses to art, that accepts residual differences, 
and that is content with ultimate inconclusiveness.  This may seem a modest conclusion, but it is 
rather like Keats's negative capability, "when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, 
mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason," becoming like the great 
poet for whom "the sense of Beauty overcomes every other consideration, or rather obliterates all 
consideration."
27
  This is, after all, an aesthetic conclusion, not unlike Lyotard's, who finds 
modernism in the impossibility of containing the sublime, which exceeds all limits and appears 
in the art which presents "the fact that the unpresentable exists."  And it is the postmodern that 
"puts forward the unpresentable in presentation itself."
28
   
There is a healthy humility in this, a lesson to be found in art both for aesthetics and for 
philosophy as a whole.  For among the many nuances of the negative lies a range of alternatives, 
not all of them destructive.  In the endorsement of a pluralism of artistic modalities and 
standards, in the primacy of perception over cognition, in the rejection of epistemological 
monotheism lie the rediscovery of an historically constituted and ontologically irreducible 
multiplicity of differences.
29
  We are left, then, centering on the perceptual, with an intense and 
directed awareness joined to a generous and open receptivity that focusses on the immediate 
without excluding the consequential.  In place of universality we must be content with a 
contextually-based generality.  And we must include other things, as well, such as the 
involvement of the body as part of an attentive attitude and an essential reciprocity among all the 
constituent factors in the aesthetic field.  Mnemonic and cognitive factors may also be forceful 
aspects of developed appreciation.  Here is a creative condition shared by aesthetics and the arts 
alike, a vital equilbrium of truths and of beauties. 
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What remains after this radical reconsideration, then, is not yet an alternative theory but a 
direction in which to move and the beginnings of what must be a quite different proposal.  More 
needs to be said than can be developed here.
30
  But this severe reappraisal of aesthetic dogma is 
an important stage in the process of reconstructing aesthetics.  To relinquish disinterestedness 
and its allied concepts is not to abandon the aesthetic but to rediscover its greater scope and 
larger power.  What we gain is access to the vastly more powerful cultural force that art has 
always been, despite the constraints of traditional theory.  Now we need to recognize that force, 
to encourage it, and to understand it anew. 
   Arnold Berleant 
18 Stonebridge Lane 
Goshen, Connecticut 06756, USA 
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